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Heaven Help the Lawyer for a Civil Liar 
Heaven help the lawyer for a civil liar-no one else will. And do not waste 
your time worrying about criminal defense lawyers with lying clients. Their 
problems with client perjury are almost over. 
It used to be the other way around. The civil trial lawyer could look to the 
American Bar Association's 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules) for clear instruction. Model Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the 
Tribunal,' and specifically, subsection 3.3(a)(4) prohibited the civil trial law- 
yer from offering evidence the lawyer knew to be false and required the law- 
yer to take reasonable remedial measures upon discovery that one of the 
lawyer's witnesses committed pe jury. If no other remedy would nullify the 
effect of the pe jury, the lawyer was required to reveal confidential informa- 
tion otherwise protected by Model Rule 1.6.2 In civil litigation, the Model 
Associate Dean, University of Minnesota School of Law. I am indebted to my colleagues, 
Victor Kramer and John Matheson, for their support and for their comments on an earlier draft of 
this essay. Carol Rieger, a talented civil trial lawyer at Lindquist & Venum in Minneapolis, and 
Professor Frances S. Fendler of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law School, offered 
perceptive criticisms, for which I am grateful. I owe a special debt to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale Law School, and reporter for the Kutak Commission, who 
was gracious in his willingness to review this article about an important part of that Commission's 
work - Model Rule 3.3. Each of the individuals mentioned identified things I had missed and 
errors I had made. They have not, necessarily, approved of my conclusions nor are they responsible 
for the errors and opinions that remain. 
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983)(hereinafter cited as MODEL 
RULES). Rule 3.3 reads as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known 
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed 
by opposing counsel; or 
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material 
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable reme- 
dial measures. 
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and 
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6. 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts 
known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, 
whether or not the facts are adverse. 
Id. 
2. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(b). Rule 3.3(b) states that "(t)he duties stated in paragraph (a) con- 
tinue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of infor- 
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Rule left the trial lawyer free to choose from a smorgasbord of reasonable 
remedial measures to nullify client perjury, without violating a client confi- 
dence or becoming the unofficial prosecutor of a pe jury charge. The crimi- 
nal defense lawyer, by contrast, was confused by a quarter century of 
conflicting advice from the great constitutional debate about the proper re- 
sponse when faced with potential client pe jury3 and by a comment to Model 
Rule 3.3 that confessed uncertainty about whether the candor rule applied in 
the criminal pra~t ice .~  The criminal defense lawyer seemingly could not 
make a move without violating either the client's confidence and the client's 
constitutional right to present a defense on the one hand, or the lawyer's 
obligation to the truth, as an officer of the court, on the other. 
In April of 1987, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 87-353.5 In- 
fluenced by the problem of a criminal defendant's potential pe jury, as dis- 
cussed in Nix v. Whiteside,6 the Formal Opinion focuses on subsection 
3.3(a)(2)' of Model Rule 3.3, rather than on subsection 3.3(a)(4).8 As a re- 
mation otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." Rule 1.6 addresses the confidentiality of information 
generally. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6. 
3. In a recent client pe jury article, Dean Lefstein lists the new recruits to the "small army" of 
commentators on criminal defendant perjury. See Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in 
Search of an Answer, 1 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 521, n.2 (1988). See also Maddox v. State, 613 
S.W.2d 275, 279 & n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (coining the "small army" term and providing an 
extensive bibliography of courts and commentators addressing the pe jurious defendant issue). For 
a comprehensive treatment of client pe jury, see Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 So. CAL. L. REV. 809 
(1977). 
4. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 comment (stating that "[wlhether an advocate for a criminally ac- 
cused has the same duty of disclosure has been intensely debated"). 
5. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (hereinaf- 
ter cited as Formal Op. 353). 
6. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
7. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2) provides that a lawyer cannot knowingly "fail to disclose a 
material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent 
act by the client." Formal Op. 353 echoes this language, stating that 
. . .if the lawyer knows, from the client's clearly stated intention, that the client will testify 
falsely, and the lawyer cannot effectively withdraw from the representation, the lawyer 
must either limit the examination of the client to subjects on which the lawyer believes the 
client will testify truthfully; or if there are none, not permit the client to testify; or if this is 
not feasible, disclose the client's intention to testify falsely to the tribunal. 
Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
8. Rule 3.3(a)(4) stipulates that a lawyer may not knowingly "offer evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." Formal Opinions of the Standing Committee, 
though no more binding on states and courts than are the Model Rules, are often as influential as 
the Model Rules in shaping the ethics of the legal profession. The Supreme Court of the United 
States considers the ethical positions of the organized bar to be guidelines for defining effective 
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 688 (1984) ("Prevailing norms 
of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to 
detkrmining what is reasonable . . . ."). 
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sult, the Opinion advises all lawyers - civil and criminal - who know that 
their clients will lie to the jury, to "disclose the client's intention to testify 
falsely to the t r ib~nal ,"~ unless they can withdraw from the representation or 
prohibit the prospective lie.lo It advises lawyers whose clients have already 
committed pe jury to "persuade the client to rectify the perjury [or] disclose 
the client's perjury to the tribunal."" 
The Formal Opinion takes away the civil trial lawyer's flexibility in choos- 
ing an appropriate remedy after a witness has offered material false evidence 
and requires disclosure of a civil client's intention to lie, even under circum- 
stances in which the lawyer does not intend to offer the client's testimony. 
By deciding that Model Rule 3.3 applies in criminal cases, the Formal Opin- 
ion purports to resolve the dilemma that has deviled criminal defense lawyers 
for more than twenty years.'* It prescribes a course of conduct, however, 
that may not solve the problem for the adversary system created by a lying 
criminal defendant. 
The interpretation of Model Rule 3.3 in Formal Opinion 87-353 is the 
profession's latest and potentially most dangerous attempt to resolve the cli- 
ent perjury problems by concentrating on the criminal defendant who is will- 
ing to lie to the jury and feels compelled to tell the lawyer about it ahead of 
time. Its conclusion that subsection 3.3(a)(2) applies to lawyers presenting 
evidence on the merits to the trier of fact misconstrues Model Rule 3.3 and 
carries the potential for disastrous results on three levels. As a matter of 
theory, the Opinion changes the delicate balance between duty to client and 
duty to court that defines our adversary dispute resolution system and that 
separates it from the inquisitorial model. As a matter of practice, the Opin- 
ion removes useful options from civil lawyers whose clients may lie, without 
any corresponding benefit to the validity of adversary justice results.I3 As a 
matter of interpretation for all of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the Opinion threatens the meaning and advice of Model Rules l.2(d)14 & 
(e)I5, 3.4(a)16 & (b)I7, 4.1(b)I8, 8.319, and 8.4(a)*O. 
9. Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. Formal Op. 353, supra note 5, states: 
If, prior to the conclusion of the proceedings, a lawyer learns that the client has given 
testimony the lawyer knows is false, and the lawyer cannot persuade the client to rectify 
the perjury, the lawyer must disclose the client's perjury to the tribunal, notwithstanding 
the fact that the information to be disclosed is information relating to the representation. 
12. See Lefstein, supra note 4, for a discussion of the problems remaining for the criminal defense 
lawyer after Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) and the issuance of Formal Opinion 87-353. 
13. Formal Opinion 87-353 may unnecessarily restrict remedial possibilities for criminal defense 
lawyers as well. This essay, however, is primarily concerned with the problems of civil lawyers and 
considers the criminal defense lawyer's problems only incidentally. 
14. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d). 
15. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(e). 
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Model Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the T r i b ~ n a l , ~ ~  was at the heart of the 
profession's debate over a new ethics code and is the centerpiece of the 1983 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The organized bar finally and explic- 
itly decided that an adversary system of dispute resolution could operate ef- 
fectively even if the obligations of the lawyer as an officer of the court were 
increased at the expense of the lawyer's single-minded attention to the inter- 
ests of the client.22 
Model Rule 3.3 addresses all aspects of a lawyer's duty of candor toward 
the tribunal and recognizes that the lawyer has a different role with respect 
to the tribunal as a forum23 than with respect to the trier of fact. It requires 
the lawyer, as the representor of information to the tribunal as forum, to be 
accurate and complete. By contrast, it requires the lawyer, as presenter of 
evidence to the trier of fact, to be only accurate-leaving the problems of 
completeness to cross examination and to the adversary's presentation. 
These differing obligations are clear from the text, the order, and the context 
of the Rule. 
The first section of Model Rule 3.3-section 3.3(a)--contains all of the 
16. MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(a). 
17. MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(b). 
18. MODEL RULES Rule 4.l(b). 
19. MODEL RULES Rule 8.3. 
20. MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(a). 
21. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3. 
22. In adopting Rule 3.3, the organized bar reversed the rule of the 1969 Model Code of Profes- 
sional Responsibility, as amended in 1974, which reflected the view that fidelity to client confidences 
was a superior value to obligations of candor to the tribunal in the adversary system. See MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1974), which compels a lawyer to disclose 
fraud perpetrated upon a tribunal "except when the information is protected as a privileged commu- 
nication" (emphasis added). 
Before 1969, the bar was either ambivalent or unclear about the relative importance of the two 
values. Canon 41, in a general way, admonished a lawyer to warn others about fraud. See AMERI- 
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, (hereinafter cited as ABA CANONS), 
Canon 41 (1908) (stating that a lawyer who knows "some fraud or deception has been practiced in 
the case must first "advis[e] his client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly 
gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appro- 
priate steps") but the opinions interpreting it were inconsistent, at best. 
23. "Tribunal as forum" is here used to describe the role of the court in making decisions on 
issues other than matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of the trier of fact. The lawyer's repre- 
sentation in that circumstance may be as varying as a factual assertion or presentation of a witness 
upon which a pretrial motion depends, an assertion about the availability or even the name of a 
witness called at trial, or a recitation of the state of the controlling law in the jurisdiction. Although 
the distinction between matters for the court and matters for the trier of fact has long been a matter 
of controversy and change as between the two, the difference between the two is always clear from 
the perspective of the lawyer making a presentation. See generally Thayer, Law and Fact in July 
Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147 (1890). 
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candor obligations of lawyers in adversary  proceeding^.^^ The first three sub- 
sections-3.3(a)(l), (2) & (3)25-describe the twin candor requirements of 
accuracy and completeness for a lawyer making representations to the tribu- 
nal as forum. Although the subsections are not limited to pre-trial matters, 
that is the context for most decisions by the tribunal as forum. Subsection 
3.3(a)(l) contains the accuracy obligation, forbidding the lawyer as 
representor to lie to the tribunal about fact or law.26 Subsections 3.3(a)(2) 
and 3.3(a)(3) are the obverse of subsection 3.3(a)(l) and contain the obliga- 
tion to be complete. They require the lawyer to present all of the facts mate- 
rial to an issue before the tribunal as forum27, and to cite all controlling legal 
precedent, even if the facts or law are harmful to the client's position.28 
Subsection 3.3(a)(4) addresses the lawyer as the presenter of evidence to 
the trier of fact and stands in sharp contrast to the first three subsections of 
Model Rule 3.3.29 Where the first three subsections speak of "facts" and 
24. See MODEL RULE 3.3(a) and infra notes 13a-20 and accompanying text. Sections 3.3(b) and 
(c) do not contain candor obligations and Section 3.3(d) does not apply to adversary proceedings. 
Section 3.3(b) provides the context for the section 3.3(a) obligations. It sets a time limit on the 
obligations as the "conclusion of the proceeding" and proclaims these obligations superior to the 
confidentiality requirements of Model Rule 1.6. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(b). 
Section 3.3(c) is not obligatory. It permits the lawyer, as presenter of evidence to the trier of fact. 
to "refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer believes is false." See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(c). 
Section 3.3(d) considers ex parte matters. Unlike the lawyer presenting evidence through wit- 
nesses in an adversary setting, the lawyer making representations to a tribunal when the adversary 
is not present is obligated to present all material facts "which will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(d). 
25. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(l), (a)(2) Br (a)(3). 
26. Rule 3.3 reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal[.] 
MODEL RULES Rule 3.3. 
27. Rule 3.3(a)(2) reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
. . . .  
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client[.] 
MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2). 
28. Rule 3.3(a)(3) reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
. . . .  
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known 
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed 
by opposing counsel[.] 
MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(3). 
29. Rule 3.3(a)(4) reads: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
. . . .  
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material 
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"law," subsection 3.3(a)(4) speaks only of "e~idence."~O Where the combina- 
tion of the first three subsections requires a complete and accurate represen- 
, tation of material fact or controlling precedent, subsection 3.3(a)(4) requires 
only an accurate presentation of evidence.31 Subsection 3.3(a)(4) forbids a 
lawyer to knowingly "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false" and 
requires "reasonable remedial measures," if one of the lawyer's witnesses has 
"offered material evidence" and the lawyer "comes to know of its falsity."32 
The obligation to be complete that emerges from the combination of the 
first three subsections of Model Rule 3.3 is distinct not only from subsection 
3.3(a)(4), but from every other candor obligation in the adversary system.33 
Borrowed from the inquisitorial system of cooperative rather than adver- 
sarial decision making, the lawyer's obligation to be complete is inconsistent 
with the adversarial assumption of presentations to and decisions by the trier 
of fact on the merits. The first three subsections of Model Rule 3.3, in con- 
trast to those adversarial assumptions, exist to allow the tribunal as forum to 
perform its enormous management role in the present pre-trial dominated 
adversary system. It is possible for a litigant to gain outcome advantage 
from the operation of pre-trial system, but that is an unfortunate conse- 
quence, not the design, of the system. The system is designed to present an 
equitable preparation and forum for the presentation of the dispute on the 
merits to the trier of fact. The lawyer, as officer of that tribunal as forum, is 
therefore prohibited from advancing the client's procedural interests34 at the 
cost of allowing the tribunal to be misled. 
The lawyer a case to a trier of fact, by contrast, is not required 
to put on all of the evidence of which the lawyer is aware. And the lawyer's 
witness need only provide accurate answers to the questions put by the inter- 
rogator and need not tell all that the witness knows. The adversarial system 
of evidence presentation assumes that one lawyer will not present all of the 
material facts. Adversarial cross-examination assumes that the witness will 
not present facts completely and may not present facts accurately. 
The distinction between the lawyer who makes representations to the tri- 
bunal and the lawyer who presents evidence to the finder of fact provides the 
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable reme- 
dial measures. 




33. The only parallel obligation to be complete is found in MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(d). It exists 
precisely because the ex parte hearing is not adversarial and the tribunal cannot depend upon the 
other side to either test the accuracy or to complete the presentation. 
34. The term "procedural interests" is used to describe all of the tactical matters that fall short of 
being the stake that the client has in the presentation on the merits to the trier of fact. 
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structure and the content for Model Rule 3.3. Subsections 3.3(a)(l), (2) & 
(3)35 speak of "material fact" and "law" for a "tribunal" and subsection 
3.3(a)(4)36 speaks only of "evidence" and makes no mention of " t r ib~na l"~~ ,  
in order to maintain the distinction-the foundation for a dispute resolution 
system in which the adversary's champion is also an officer of the court. 
Model Rule 3.3 was adopted in 1983 with the intention that it describe the 
candor obligations for lawyers in both civil and criminal matters, though the 
drafters were aware that the consitutional criminal procedure issues domi- 
nating the client perjury dialogue had not been res0lved.3~ They authorized, 
therefore, a comment to subsection 3.3(a)(4) that recognized the possibility 
that the criminal defendant's rights to testify and to counsel might modify 
the application of subsection 3.3(a)(4) to criminal defense lawyers. 39 
The profession has viewed the client perjury problem as one of constitu- 
tional criminal procedure, at least since Professor Monroe Freedman's sug- 
gestion that criminal defense lawyers face a constitutional dilemma when 
they know their clients intend to lie to the AS a result of this constitu- 
tional dilemma, the client perjury dialogue has focused on the one-in-a-mil- 
lion criminal defendant who will lie to the jury but not to the lawyer - to 
the virtual exclusion of the overwhelming number of civil litigants who 
might stretch the truth on a regular basis in deposition or at trial. Without a 
similar constitutional claim to the right to testify or to the assistance of coun- 
sel, civil litigants have been treated as a lesser included category of criminal 
defendants by client perjury commentators. They have assumed that any 
solution that will work for the more difficult consitutional problem of the 
lying criminal defendant will work for all liars and their lawyers.43 
35. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(l), (a)(2) & (a)(3). 
36. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4). 
37. Id. Note that Rule 3.3(d) provides that ex parte presentations follow the same pattern of 
"material fact" and "tribunal" as Rule 3.3(a)(2). 
38. See MODEL RULE Rule 3.3 comment. 
39. The comment to Rule 3.3 acknowledges that "the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty in 
such a situation may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the right to coun- 
sel in criminal cases." Id. 
40. 457 U.S. 157 (1986). 
41. Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
42. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). Professor Freedman suggests that a constitutional prob- 
lem arises when an attorney, fearing that his client will pejure himself, refuses to put the client on 
the stand. Freedman states that the client might appeal on the basis of a claim of "due process and 
denial of the right to counsel." Id. at 1477. 
43. On the issue of presenting a false case, Professor Subin observed that "civil lawyers ride the 
ethical coattails of the criminal lawyer. . . . I f .  . . the criminal lawyer should not be permitted to 
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The dialogue's concentration on the criminal defendant, combined with 
the uncertainty about the application of Model Rule 3.3 to the criminal de- 
fense lawyer, may explain why the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility issued no opinion interpreting Model Rule 3.3 
until four years after its adoption.44 Despite the Rule's new understanding of 
the relationship between the often competing obligations of candor toward 
the tribunal and client confidences, and despite the existence of two Standing 
Committee opinions on candor that were apparently contrary to Model Rule 
3.3,45 the Committee did not comment on Model Rule 3.3 until after the 
Supreme Court of the United States suggested in dictum that a criminal de- 
fense lawyer may be under no constitutional compulsion to present the testi- 
mony of a criminal defendant, if the lawyer knows the defendant will commit 
pe 
Emanuel Whiteside testified truthfully4' after his lawyer threatened to di- 
vulge to the court and to the jury that his testimony was perjured.48 The 
Supreme Court held that the lawyer's coercion of the truthful testimony did 
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washing- 
impede. . . a truthful verdict. . . then similar claims by civil lawyers would be weaker still." Subin, 
The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission'? Refictions on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (1987). 
44. See Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
45. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (hereinafter 
cited as Formal Op. 287) (interpreting ABA Canons, advises that attorney for client in divorce 
action may not reveal to the court his client's perjury in securing divorce, when such perjury is 
revealed to him by the client after divorce is granted); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Informal Op. 1314) (interpreting the 
1969 Model Code, states that attorney has no duty to disclose client's perjury to court after it has 
occurred, since "the confidential privilege . . . must be upheld over any obligation of the lawyer to 
betray the client's confidence in seeking rectification of any fraud" by his client). 
46. See 457 U.S. 157, 173. Dictum in the United States Supreme Court is often tomorrow's 
opinion. In this case, however, there is reason to believe that the dictum may not be followed. The 
important points of ethics and criminal procedure in the dictum were not raised, briefed, nor argued 
by the parties. In addition, Chief Justice Burger, who had a long-standing agenda on the issue, is no 
longer a member of the Court. Although commentators have varying views on the reach of Nix v. 
Whiteside, and on the likelihood that its dictum will become law, no one suggests that the court's 
description of the appropriate lawyer conduct is anything but dictum. Compare Lefstein, supra note 
4, at 525 ("Counsel will . . . find it difficult to ignore . . . the Supreme Court's opinion in Nix v. 
Whiteside") with Freedman, The Aftermath of Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora's 
Box, 23 CRIM L. BULL. 25,28-29 (1987) (noting efforts by the ABA and American Law Institute to 
avoid the Nix outcome) and Auerbach, What Are Law Clerks For?-Comments on Nix v. Whiteside, 
23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 979, 982 (1986) (arguing that rather than settling the matter, the Court in 
Nix merely "raised the issues that the Court saved for another day"). 
47. The Supreme Court accepted the Iowa Supreme Court's conclusion that Whiteside intended 
to commit perjury. 457 U.S. at 163. Dean Lefstein argues persuasively that the Iowa Supreme 
Court did not use an "actual knowledge" test in assessing the lawyer's state of mind. Lefstein, 
supra note 4, at 532. For a discussion of the appropriate meaning of "know" in the context of 
~ o d e l  Rule 3.3, see infra text accompanying notes 88-95. 
48. 475 U.S. 157, 161. 
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ton.49 Although Nix v. WhitesideS0 did not raise the issue of whether it is 
constitutionally permissible for a lawyer or a tribunal to prohibit a poten- 
tially perjurious criminal defendant from testifying, the majority opinion sug- 
gests that a lawyer's assistance is not constitutionally ineffective, if the 
lawyer's threat of disclosure actually dissuades the client from te~tifying.~~ 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion suggests that a lawyer is ethically 
obligated to disclose potential pe jury to the tribunals2 and implies that the 
tribunal has power to prohibit a criminal defendant's testimony upon a find- 
ing that the defendant will testify falsely.53 
Justice Blackmun, joined in concurrence by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Stevens, states that the problem of how a defense attorney ought to act 
when faced with a client who intends to commit pe jury is a "thorny prob- 
lem" not raised by the Whiteside case.s4 Justice Brennan, in a separate con- 
currence, chastises the majority for a gratuitous excursion into rules of 
ethical conduct over which it enjoys no juri~diction.~~ The majority's de- 
scription of the "correct response to a criminal client's suggestion that he will 
perjure himself," according to Justice Brennan, "is pure discourse without 
force of law."s6 He warns "[llawyers, judges, bar associations, students and 
others [to] understand that the problem has not now been 'decided.' "57 
The Standing Committee began work on Formal Opinion 87-35358 soon 
after the Whiteside decision. It rejected the narrow interpretation of White- 
side, that a lawyer's threat that produces truthful testimony is not ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,S9 and adopted Chief 
49. Id.(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
50. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
51. Id. at 173. While Chief Justice Burger's wide ranging discourse on ethics and criminal proce- 
dure seems to approve a threat that compels a potential perjurer not to testify, at least one court 
actually faced with a defendant who did not testify reached a contrary judgement. See United 
States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 @. Me. 1986). The Butts Court held that the defendant's failure 
to testify as a result of counsel's prohibition of such testimony satisfies the prejudice prong of the 
test in Strickland v. Washington. Id. at 1148-49. 
52. 475 U.S. 157. 
53. Although concerned with what the lawyer, not the tribunal, may -do, the Chief Justice ob- 
served that "[wlhatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a 
right does not extend to testifying falsely." 475 U.S. 157, 173. The necessary implication of the 
opinion is that the lawyer should tell the court about the proposed pe jury so that the court can take 
action to prevent it. The due process problem with a tribunal excluding a witness is not a problem 
of criminal procedure, the focus of Chief Justice Burger's attention. It offends the historic purpose 
and nature of all jury trials. For a discussion of the authorities that hold that a tribunal may not 
prohibit a witness from testifying because of its own judgment that the witness will commit perjury, 
see infra text accompanying notes 54-70. 
54. 475 U.S. 157, 178 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
55. Id. at 176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
56. Id. at 177. 
57. Id. 
58. Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
59. 466 U.S. 668. 
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Justice Burger's expansive position.60 The committee said that "the Supreme 
Court of the United States held in Nix v. Whiteside. . . that a criminal defend- 
ant is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in giving false testimony and 
that a lawyer who refuses such assistance. . . has not deprived the client of 
effective assistance of coun~e l . "~~  
The Standing Committee took Whiteside to mean that there was no,longer 
any constitutional impediment to applying Model Rule 3.3 to criminal de- 
fense lawyers; and it read the Model Rule to require disclosure of potential or 
completed client perjury. The Committee's interpretation of Whiteside, as a 
decision that the Constitution permits a lawyer to disclose a client's intended 
perjury and allows the tribunal to exclude the testimony on the basis of the 
lawyer's representation, should have liberated the client perjury dialogue 
from the tyranny of the criminal defense lawyer hypothetical. If the applica- 
bility of Model Rule 3.3 to the criminal defense lawyer was decided in White- 
side, the client perjury discussion should have moved on to the more 
important inquiry about the variety of ways in which a lawyer might meet 
the Model Rule 3.3 candor obligations in various litigation situations. 
It did not work out that way. The ghostly figure of the criminal defense 
lawyer haunts the consideration of client perjury in Formal Opinion 87-353 
to the exclusion of civil examples.62 The lack of civil examples may explain 
why the Formal Opinion does not explore the various lawyer roles contem- 
plated by Model Rule 3.3 nor consider the possibility that subsection 
3.3(a)(4) applies to all lawyers faced with the client perjury dilemma - in- 
cluding criminal defense lawyers - and that subsection 3.3(a)(2) disclosure 
applies only in those litigation situations that do not involve issues for the 
trier of fact. 
Formal Opinion 87-353 interprets Model Rule 3.3 to impose an almost 
universal obligation of disclosure to the tribunal upon all trial lawyers faced 
with potential or completed client perjury, by concluding that the mandatory 
disclosure provision in subsection 3.3(a)(2)63 applies to a lawyer presenting 
60. Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
61. Id. 
62. The Standing Committee discussed and overruled two earlier and widely followed committee 
opinions that preferred criminal cases: Formal Op. 287, supra note 25 and Informal Op. 1314, 
supra note 25. Although Formal Op. 287 concerned discovered pe jury in both a civil divorce and 
criminal sentencing, Formal Op. 353, supra note 5, did not consider the civil case as a matter of 
discovered perjury. The divorce pe jury that had been relevant to the disclosure question in Formal 
Op. 287 was discovered after the "conclusion of the proceeding," thus putting it outside of the time 
limitation in Rule 3.3 (b) and, therefore, beyond consideration of the allocability of that Rule's 
remedy requirements. Although Informal Op. 1314 was not, by its terms, limited to criminal cases, 
the committee uses only criminal court examples for the problem raised in that opinion-prospec- 
tive false testimony. 
63. Model Rule 3.3 (a)(2) states that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose a material 
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evidence to the trier of fact.G4 No other portion of the Model Rule mandates 
disclosure of facts in an adversary proceeding. The Standing Committee did 
not find conflict between subsection 3.3(a)(2), mandatory disclosure, and the 
subsection 3.3(a)(4) requirement of any "reasonable remedial measure" that 
will nullify the effect of false material evidence.65 Indeed, the Committee 
proceeded to an analysis of whether subsection 3.3(a)(2) applies to client per- 
jury precisely because it believed the two subsections complemented each 
other: 
Rule 3.3(a)(2) and (4) complement each other. While (a)(4), itself, does 
not expressly require disclosure by the lawyer for the tribunal of the client's 
false testimony after the lawyer has offered it and learns of its falsity, such 
disclosure will be the only "reasonable remedial [measure]" the lawyer will 
be able to take if the client is unwilling to rectify the pe 
If the complementary view of the relationship between subsection 3.3(a)(2) 
and subsection 3.3(a)(4) is coincidentally correct for the criminal defense 
lawyer,'j7 it is not correct for lawyers whose clients intend to or have lied in 
civil cases. The Formal Opinion's attempt to clarify the client perjury di- 
lemma for the criminal defense lawyer unwittingly produces unfortunate 
changes for the civil trial lawyer. Application of the subsection 3.3(a)(2) 
mandatory disclosure requirement to the lawyer presenting evidence to the 
trier of fact nullifies the remedial flexibility that subsection 3.3(a)(4) gives to 
the civil trial lawyer and abrogates the subsection 3.3(a)(4) limitation of their 
remedy requirement to those lawyers who have "offered material evidence" 
- two results that violate the basic tenet of construction that every word and 
phrase of a rule must be given effect.68 
The failure of Formal Opinion 87-353 to identify a contradiction between 
subsection 3.3(a)(2) and subsection 3.3(a)(4) - on the assumption that the 
criminal model for client perjury would cover civil cases - is the same over- 
sight made during the great constitutional debate over whether a criminal 
fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the 
client." MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2). 
64. See Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Criminal defense lawyers may sometimes be in situations where disclosure is not the only 
reasonable remedial measure available. Indeed, disclosure to the tribunal may never be a reasonable 
remedy for any trial lawyer making a presentation to a trier of fact. See infra text accompanying 
footnotes 53-73. 
68. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION Chapter 7 
(1988). 
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defense lawyer must keep a client's pe jury ~onfidential .~~ Whatever may be 
the lot of the criminal defense lawyer whose client has constitutional control 
over the presentation of the case,70 the civil trial lawyer who cannot persuade 
the client to rectify the perjury has "remedial measures" other than disclo- 
sure that are "reasonable" and that will ensure that pe jury does not infect 
the adversary system result, without divulging the client's perjury or breach- 
ing the client's confidence. The civil lawyer can withdraw exhibits, stipulate 
to facts, withdraw an issue from jury consideration, agree to a new trial, 
accept remittitur, or engage in other after-evidence or after verdict activity 
that will nullify the perjury without disclosing a confidence or accusing a 
client of Further, the court in a civil case may direct a verdict 
against the client, enter a judgement notwithstanding the verdict, or order a 
new trial - actions unavailable to a criminal tribunal - and thus remove 
any need for the lawyer to remedy the client's perjury.72 
The Committee's conclusion that subsection 3.3(a)(2) applies to all client 
perjury - because the lawyer knows a material fact, the disclosure of which 
is necessary to avoid assisting the perjury - obligates the non-offering law- 
yer for the civil liar to disclose client perjury, even though the lawyer did not 
offer the client's testimony. Unlike the defense lawyer in a criminal case, the 
civil trial lawyer's client may be called to testify at a deposition or by the 
opponent for cross examination under the rules at trial. If the civil lawyer's 
client, when called to testify by the other side, tells a lie of which the lawyer 
is aware, the Committee's view of Model Rule 3.3 forces the lawyer to dis- 
close the perjury to the tribunal. Presumably the same requirement of disclo- 
sure applies to a lawyer who appears at a deposition or trial for a non-party 
witness. Although Bentham might applaud such a change in the adversary 
69. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
70. To the extent the Committee's view of the criminal defense lawyer's lack of remedial options 
is correct, it is in part because the Constitution and the Model Rules give control over case presenta- 
tion to the criminal defendant, personally, and in part because the tribunal has diminished power to 
manage and no power to decide criminal cases against a defendant. See infra text accompanying 
notes 96-100. 
71. Model Rule 1.2 vests ultimate control over the "means" for achieving the client's "objec- 
tives" in the lawyer. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 comment ("a lawyer is not required to . . . 
employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so"). The lawyer must "con- 
sult" with his client, but need not obtain the client's agreement to the "means . . . to be pursued," 
except as to the acceptance of an offer to settle. By contrast, Rule 1.2 requires client consent to 
decisions about important "means" in a criminal trial, including client testimony. 
72. Remedies other than disclosure to the tribunal in time to affect potential perjury provide the 
lawyer with a measure of flexibility because they allow time for the lawyer to be creative and per- 
suasive with the client. This is particularly important in civil litigation, where the bulk of the 
testimony, and probably the perjury, are in deposition. The Formal Opinion 353, supra note 5, 
insistence on disclosure to the tribunal forecloses less drastic, but equally effective remedies and 
forces an issue that might not otherwise arise. 
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system,73 if the drafters of Model Rule 3.3 intended such a broad attack on 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, there is nothing in the com- 
mission drafts, the American Bar Association debates, or the comments to 
the Model Rules to suggest it. The drafters of subsection 3.3(a)(4) presented 
a vision of adversary justice in which the obligation to remedy false evidence 
rested solely with the offeror. Thus, a lawyer aware that a witness called by 
the opponent has told a lie, has no obligation to expose the witness,74 particu- 
larly if it is the lawyer's client. 
The criminal law assumption in Formal Opinion 87-353 may, also, ac- 
count for its failure to attach any significance to the Model Rule's apparent 
description of different candor obligations for lawyers in different roles. The 
criminal prosecution is a particularly unfortunate vehicle for understanding 
the broad scope of Model Rule 3.3 and the limited applicability of its first 
three subsections. The criminal justice system, compared to civil litigation, 
rarely sees the lawyer as representor of information to the tribunal as forum. 
Criminal pre-trial matters, to the extent they exist, are usually mini-trials in 
which the tribunal hears evidence as a trier of fact and law on the merits of a 
constitutional issue. The lawyer is only rarely the source of information 
upon which the criminal tribunal will reach a constitutional decision and 
there are relatively few forum decisions to be made. Civil litigation, by con- 
trast, is mainly pre-trial procedural wrangling over compelling discovery, 
Rule 11 violations, attorney disqualification, production of documents, and 
other procedural matters for which the tribunal makes a decision based upon 
information gathered more from the lawyers than from witnesses.75 Had the 
committee a pre-trial example before it, with the lawyer as the major source 
of information for the tribunal, it might have realized that the candor obliga- 
tions of subsections 3.3(a)(l), (2) & (3) are written mainly for that lawyer 
and not for the lawyer as presenter of evidence to the trier of fact.76 
The mandatory disclosure provision of subsection 3.3(a)(2) is not neces- 
sary for the Formal Opinion's conclusion that a lawyer must disclose a cli- 
73. Jeremy Bentham opposed confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. He believed they 
served no useful purpose and had no base in rationality. See J. BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDI- 
CIAL EVIDENCE 302-12 (1827). His view, though attractive to many, including this author, has 
never prevailed. 
74. The lawyer probably would be a fool to cross examine such a witness and derelict in duty not 
to take advantage in closing argument of the other side's helpful presentation of evidence. 
75. Summary judgment motions are, also, a large part of civil pre-trial practice. While the tribu- 
nal is required to consider potential evidence, it is not required to weigh the evidence in place of a 
trier of fact. Quite the contrary, the tribunal is asked to determine that there are no issues for a trier 
of fact. 
76. Model Rule 3.3 applies to all tribunals and subsections 3.3(a) (I), (2), & (3) apply to all 
presentations other than those to a trier of fact. See supra discussion accompanying notes 12-20. 
Appellate arguments, therefore, that are addressed to any issue other than a review of the propriety 
of the verdict of a trier of fact, are included within the coverage of the first three subsections. 
Heinonline 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 897 19881989 
ent's perjury when there is no other reasonable remedy available to cure the 
damage caused by the introduction of the false material evidence.77 Indeed, 
the comment to Model Rule 3.3 contemplates that disclosure might be a 
subsection 3.3(a)(4) "reasonable remedial measure" in some  circumstance^.^^ 
The Committee, however, may have felt obligated to answer more than the 
question about what a lawyer should do about completed client perjury. It 
may have felt obligated by the long debate over the potential perjury of a 
criminal defendant to find an answer in Model Rule 3.3 to the problem: 
What should a criminal defense lawyer do when a client who intends perjury 
tells the defense lawyer of the intention before testifying? 
The Committee looked for the answer in Nix v. Wh i t e~ ide~~  and found the 
Chief Justice's observation that a lawyer must always disclose potential per- 
jury rather than allow the client to testify falsely. But the remedy require- 
ment of subsection 3.3(a)(4) depended upon the lawyer's discovery of 
completed pe jury. The Chief Justice's mandatory disclosure answer was in 
subsection 3.3(a)(2). 
The Committee started with the wrong question, in considering whether 
subsection 3.3(a)(2) applied to client perjury. Instead of asking about the 
nature of the obligation in subsection 3.3(a)(2) and to whom it applied, the 
Committee asked about the secondary object of the ~ubsect ion .~~ It asked 
whether "criminal or fraudulent act" in subsection 3.3(a)(2) included client 
per j~ry .~ '  The Committee's answer to the wrong question led it astray: 
Although Rule 3.3(a)(2) . . . does not specifically refer to perjury . . . it 
would require an irrational reading of the language [in subsection 
3.3(a)(2)]: 'a criminal or fraudulent act by the client,' to exclude false testi- 
mony by the client.82 
Subsection 3.3(a)(2) requires disclosure to the tribunal only when it is nec- 
essary to "avoid assisting" a criminal or fraudulent act by the client. The 
Committee concluded that subsection 3.3(a)(2) covered potential client per- 
jury, because it found the conduct described .in the first sentence of subsec- 
tion 3.3(a)(4)-"offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false9'-to be an 
"assist."83 
The Committee returned to the question of completed pe jury, after find- 
ing subsection 3.3(a)(2) applicable to potential perjury. It concluded that 
subsection 3.3(a)(2) also applied to completed pe jury, because "a lawyer's 
77. See Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
78. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 comment. 
79. 475 U.S. 157. 
80. Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
8 1 .  Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
Heinonline 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 898 19881989 
failure to take remedial measures . . . when the lawyer [discovers] the client 
has given false testimony, is included" as an assist needed to invoke subsec- 
tion 3.3(a)(2).84 
The central thesis of this essay is that subsection 3.3(a)(2) cannot apply to 
a lawyer presenting evidence to a trier of fact. The Committee found itself in 
the wrong subsection of Model Rule 3.3 for the answer to the client perjury 
problem, because it began its analysis with the wrong question. Asking 
whether the "criminal or fraudulent act" language of the subsection includes 
perjury and concluding that "it would require an irrational reading of the 
language: 'a criminal or fraudulent act by the client' to exclude false testi- 
mony by the client9'85 was no more useful than asking if "client" includes the 
president of a corporate defendant and concluding that "it would require an 
'irrational reading of the language 'client' to exclude the president of a corpo- 
rate defendant." Both answers may be correct, but neither is of any value in 
determining the lawyer conduct covered by subsection 3.3(a)(2). The Com- 
mittee did not spend time on the general structure of Model Rule 3.3 and the 
specific language and obligation of subsection 3.3(a)(2), once it discovered 
the attractive short path to subsection 3.3(a)(2). That short path, unfortu- 
nately, passed by the difference between subsection 3.3(a)(2) and subsection 
3.3(a)(4) and obscured the distinction between "fact" and opinion; informa- 
tion that is "material" and information that is not; the "tribunal" as a forum, 
of which the lawyer is an officer, and the trier of fact that weighs "evidence;" 
a lawyer who makes a "statement" to a tribunal and a lawyer who "offer[s] 
evidence9'-all of which are critical to an understanding of Model Rule 3.3. 
Two examples from a single hypothetical highlight the importance of the 
distinction between making representations to a tribunal as forum and 
presenting evidence to a trier of fact. They demonstrate how the precise lan- 
guage of Model Rule 3.3 recognizes and preserves the distinction. 
Plaintiff in a housing discrimination class action against a corporate owner 
of apartment buildings in Minneapolis, Chicago, New York, and Los Ange- 
les makes a motion for production of documents after a request is denied by 
defendant. The lawyer believed the document request to be burdensome 
under the law of the jurisdiction. Officers of the corporate defendant and the 
lawyer know that the documents are located in Minneapolis, Chicago, New 
84. Id. The committee stated that 
[i]t is apparent to the Committee that. . .Rule 3.3(a)(2). . .is intended to guide the conduct 
of the lawyer as an officer of the court as a prophylactic measure to protect against client 
perjury contaminating the judicial process. Thus, when the lawyer knows the client has 
committed pe jury, disclosure to the tribunal is necessary under Rule 3.3 (a) (2) to avoid 
assisting the client's criminal act. 
Id. 
85.  Id. 
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York, and Los Angeles. Subsection 3.3(a)(l), which requires accuracy from 
the lawyer making representations that the tribunal will use to resolve the 
plaintiff's motion for production, prohibits the lawyer's inaccurate assertion 
either that the documents do not exist or that they are located somewhere 
else, for example, Washington, D.C. Similarly, subsection 3.3(a)(l) prohibits 
the lawyer's statement that a controlling case in the jurisdiction holds that 
such a document request is burdensome, when the case cited for the proposi- 
tion holds the exact opposite. Subsection 3.3(a)(l) does not prohibit the law- 
yer's assertion or presentation of a witness' affidavit that presents incomplete 
information to the tribunal that "there are documents in Minneapolis, Chi- 
cago, and New York," even though there are also documents in Los Angeles. 
It does not prohibit the lawyer's presentation of three favorable cases on bur- 
densome document requests, while suppressing the latest and contrary prece- 
dent. But subsections 3.3(a)(2)-"material fact" (document location)-and 
3.3(a)(3)--"legal authority" (the controlling precedentwo prohibit the 
lawyer from being incomplete in making those representations, when the tri- 
bunal will use them to decide the production motion. 
Contrast the lawyer's obligation under subsections 3.3(a)(l), (2) and (3), to 
be complete in the document motion, with the lawyer's obligation under sub- 
section 3.3 (a)(4), as the offeror of evidence to a trier of fact. The lawyer may 
properly ask an officer of the corporate client "Does the corporation rent 
apartments to blacks?". No ethical, procedural or evidentiary rule requires 
the lawyer to supplement the accurate response: "Of course; we have black 
tenants in Minneapolis, Chicago and New York." The lawyer's knowledge 
that the client has never rented to blacks in Los Angeles and is actively en- 
gaged in racial discrimination in that city does not require the lawyer to 
disclose to anyone that the witness' answer is incomplete. Even if the lawyer 
believes that the trier of fact will infer from the answer that the corporate 
client does not discriminate anywhere, the lawyer has no duty to disclose the 
omission. It may well be - and the adversary system assumes - that the 
plaintiff's lawyer will ask "Have you ever rented to blacks in Los Angeles?". 
Model Rule 3.3 obligates the corporation's lawyer to do something only after 
the corporate officer falsely answers "yes." Subsection 3.3 (a)(4) instructs the 
lawyer to take "reasonable remedial measures" to nullify the effect of the 
6 6 yes." 
In both the pre-trial and the trial situations, the client's incomplete answer 
is deceptive and has the purpose to deceive - "fraudulent" as defined in the 
Model Rules.86 Nevertheless, subsection 3.3 (a)(2) applies in the documents 
example before the tribunal and does not apply in the discrimination example 
86. The terminology section of the Model Rules defines "fraud" or "fraudulent" as denoting 
"conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to 
apprise another of relevant information." MODEL RULES Terminology. 
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before the trier of fact. The applicability of subsection 3.3(a) (2) depends first 
upon the role of the lawyer, and only secondarily upon whether the client's 
action is fraudulent. 
B. INTENT TO LIE AND PERJURY ARE RARELY "MATERIAL FACTS" 
Model Rule 3.3 does not contemplate that disclosure is always the appro- 
priate remedy for client pe jury. And it almost never contemplates disclosure 
of client pejury to the tribunal. Although Model Rule 3.3 presents a star- 
tling shift from the existing candor ethic by requiring a remedy for perjury, 
even when it necessitates divulging a client conf iden~e,~~ it does not go so far 
as to require lawyers to become the system's perjury police in every case of 
potential or completed pe jury. The Model Rule maintains the adversary sys- 
tem assumptions that common law tribunals do not have the same power to 
pre-screen witnesses for credibility as do courts in an inquisitorial dispute 
resolution system and that adversary system credibility judgments belong 
uniquely and unalterably to the trier of fact. 88 If the lawyer for a liar has no 
remedy that will purge the lie from the adversary system result, other than 
disclosure, that disclosure must be to the trier of fact, not to the tribunal. 
Only the trier of fact has the power to give the lawyer's disclosure the weight 
that it deserves.89 The Committee's conclusion that subsection 3.3(a)(2) man- 
dates disclosure of client pe jury to the tribunal incorrectly implies the con- 
trary. It would not have required disclosure to the tribunal, if it thought that 
the tribunal had no power to nullify the perjury with the lawyer's 
information. 
The precise language describing the obligation of subsection 3.3(a)(2) dem- 
onstrates that the requirement of disclosure to the tribunal does not apply to 
a lawyer faced with the potential of completed client perjury at trial.90 The 
87. Under the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, as amended in 1974, and the ABA 
opinions interpreting it, the client's confidence could not be violated, even if necessary to remedy a 
client's completed perjury. Although prior promulgations, arguably, preferred candor to confi- 
dence, the Model Rule is the first to be explicit about the inferiority of the confidentiality principle. 
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONS~BL~L~TY Canon 4. 
88. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933)(reversible error where trial judge's instruc- 
tions included comment that in his opinion defendant was lying when he testified). 
89. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978) suggests, in dictum, that it is a denial 
of due process for a defense attorney in a criminal case to testify before the trier of fact about the 
lawyer's belief that the defendant committed perjury, because that would disable "the fact finder 
from judging the merits of the defendant's defense." To the extent that the dictum about due 
process survives Nix v. Whiteside, 457 U.S. 157, it only strengthens the conclusion that only the 
lawyer's presentation of facts to the trier of fact allows the jury to consider all that is relevant in 
reaching an appropriate decision. 
90. Subsection 3.3(a)(2) does apply to client perjury committed before a tribunal hearing testi- 
mony to determine an issue wholly within the tribunal's jurisdiction and for which a future trier of 
fact has no role -for example, the earlier document production motion. Client testimony is rare in 
those circumstances. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2). 
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subsection requires disclosure only of "material fa~t[s]."~l The lawyer's con- 
clusion that the client intends to commit pe jury is never a "fact;" neither is 
the lawyer's conclusion that the client's testimony was perjurious. 
"My client will commit perjury" is a lawyer's opinion, not a "fact," 
whether it derives from the client's assertion of an intent to lie or from a 
combination of the client's proposed testimony and contrary information the 
lawyer has from another source. In either case, the lawyer has reached a 
conclusion, actually a prediction, about what the client will do - the kind of 
opinion that is routinely excluded from evidence because it is spec~lat ive.~~ 
"My client committed pe jury" avoids the speculative problem, but remains 
the lawyer's opinion and not a "fact" upon which subsection 3.3(a)(2) pre- 
conditions d i sc los~re .~~  
Even in those circumstances in which the lawyer has "facts" to disclos'e to 
the tribunal, they will almost never be "material." A lawyer's report to the 
tribunal of the occurrence of a conversation, "my client told me she intends 
to tell a lie," is about a fact - the conversation. Rather than the client's 
communicated conclusion, a lawyer might transmit the details of the client's 
intent: "My client's president originally told me that the corporation does 
not rent to blacks in Los Angeles. After I said that would probably be the 
fact upon which the plaintiff will prevail, the president told me she 
remembered that the corporation does rent to blacks in Los Angeles." The 
lawyer's report to the tribunal might include the fact of communication com- 
bined with other facts the lawyer has collected: 
the president of my client tells me she is going to testify that the corpora- 
tion rents to blacks in Los Angeles. I have seen all of their records and 
interviewed all of the people in the Los Angeles office and I found no rec- 
ord or statement that the corporation has ever rented to blacks in Los An- 
geles. I did find a memo from the President saying, "the corporation will 
not rent to blacks in Los Angeles." 
91. Id. 
92. Rule 701, which limits the range of acceptable testimony, allows a lay witness to express an 
opinion or inference only if "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to 
a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." See FED. R. EVID. 
Rule 7d. 
A lawyer's testimony, "my client will commit perjury," an opinion, is not nearly so "helpful to a 
clear understanding" as the lawyer's testimony, "my client told me that she will say she saw it 
happen on Wednesday and three days ago she told me that she saw it happen on Tuesday." More- 
over, until the client has testified, her credibility is not at issue. Until her credibility is at issue, 
neither the lawyer's opinion nor the facts of the conversation are helpful to "the determination of a 
fact in issue." 
93. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 (a)(2). Note that such a statement by an attorney is probably an 
inadmissable opinion. "Perjury" is a legal conclusion about the commission of a crime-a conclu- 
sion that can only be reached by a jury after a trial at which the defendant is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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In order to be "material," any of the preceding sets of facts must relate to 
an issue that the tribunal has the power to decide.94 Subsection 3.3(a)(4) 
supports this view of materiality. Even though false testimony is never good, 
subsection 3.3(a)(4) does not require a remedy for every falsehood. The first 
sentence of subsection 3.3(a)(4) sets a standard that prohibits lawyers from 
knowingly offering any false evidence; but the only false evidence that the 
lawyer must remedy is false evidence that is "material."95 This is consistent 
with the perjury statute in almost every jurisdiction. False evidence carries 
no penalty, while giving "material" false evidence constitutes the crime of 
pe 
An adversary system tribunal has no power to do anything with facts 
about potential or completed perjury before a trier of fact.97 The tribunal 
might not like what it hears when the lawyer discloses, but it has no power to 
do anything about or with the d i~closure .~~ While a court of inquisition 
might properly decide who should testify and what weight ought to be given 
94. The Model Rules do not define "material," but at a minimum, facts must relate to something 
a decision maker has the power to decide in order to be "material." A legal dictionary definition of 
material is "[i]mportant; more or less necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits; 
having to do with matter, as distinguished from form." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1128 (4th ed. 
1975). 
95. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4). 
96. The federal perjury statute is typical of those in most of the states. It states, in part 
"[wlhoever. . . having taken an oath before a competent tribunal. . . willfully and contrary to such 
oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true . . ." 18 U.S.C. 
$ 162 1 (1 976)(emphasis added). 
97. Even a civil tribunal, which unlike a criminal tribunal becomes a trier of fact at the time a 
party requests a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, cannot use the lawyer's 
"facts" about the client's testimony, even if they are presented to the trier of fact, to take the 
decision on the merits from the trier of fact. The only time that a credibility judgment can be taken 
from the trier of fact is when there is no evidence contrary to the uncontradicted and unimpeached 
evidence produced by the party requesting a directed verdict. In that circumstance, the trial court 
may take the matter from the trier of fact, because the trier of fact is not free to disbelieve the 
movant's witnesses without contrary evidence from the other party. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. 
Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931). If any evidence is presented that raises a fact question - for example, 
the client's perjured testimony - there is an issue for the trier of fact and the tribunal may not 
direct a verdict, no matter how certain the tribunal is about the client's lack of credibility. Cf: 
Maroney v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 123 Minn. 480, 144 N.W. 149 (1913) (fact that case 
rested wholly upon testimony of plaintiff and her physician was not sufficient grounds for court to 
"depriv[e] her of the right. to have the facts in her case passed upon by a jury"). 
98. There is only one instance in which the lawyer's conversation with the client might be "mate- 
rial" to something within the tribunal's province. It may be that the lawyer's testimony before the 
jury is the only way to nullify the client's perjury. The lawyer, presumably, would consult with the 
opponent, explain the nature of the testimony, and receive no objection to it. Under Model Rule 
3.7, a lawyer may act as a witness in a trial in which he also serves as an advocate if his testimony 
relates to an uncontested issue. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7. Thus, if the opponent does not contest 
the lawyer's testimony about the client's perjury, Model Rule 3.7 does not prohibit the lawyer's 
testimony. If, however, the tribunal is concerned that Model Rule 3.7 might prohibit the testimony, 
the lawyer's facts become material to an issue for the tribunal as forum. It must determine whether 
the lawyer may testify before the trier of fact. 
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to the testimony, an adversary system tribunal may not dismiss a witness, 
even if the tribunal believes the witness will commit perjury.99 The trier of 
fact must have the opportunity to hear the testimony and accept so 'much of 
it as the trier of fact, in its sole discretion, considers credible.'* Similarly, 
the tribunal has no authority to dismiss a witness and instruct the trier of fact 
not to consider the testimony, because the tribunal believes the testimony to 
have been perjurious.101 The trier of fact's complete authority on issues of 
credibility is so important that even those jurisdictions that allow the tribu- 
nal to comment on the evidence do not allow comment so strong as to effec- 
99. A flatly contradictory prior statement by the prospective witness does not per se invalidate 
the testimony and justify keeping it from the trier of fact. Guthrie v. 'Van Hyfte, 36 I11.2d 252, 222 
N.E.2d 492 (1966). The point is so axiomatic and well known to trial courts that lawyers do not try 
to keep testimony from the trier of fact by challenging witness credibility and trial courts do not 
exclude testimony on credibility grounds. As a result, there are few decisions that even discuss the 
issue, let alone approve, prohibiting the testimony of a potential pe rjurer. Not even the Chief Jus- 
tice's discourse in Nix v. Whiteside presents authority for or states the bald proposition that a court 
may exclude a witness upon its own determination of the witness' future credibility. 
100. The trier of fact is entitled to accept part of a witness' testimony and reject another part of 
that same witness' testimony. Dodwell v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 384 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1964). 
The testimony of a witness that is self contradicting and, therefore, self destructive, is the only 
narrow exception to the rule. No case is made for the jury where a party presents evidence from 
only one witness when that witness' testimony contains statements that cancel each other out so 
that there is, in effect, no evidence for the other party. Foerstel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 241 
S.W.2d 792 (Mo. App. 1951). 
101. In United States v. Thompson, 615 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1980) a prosecution witness testified 
contrary to her previous grand jury testimony. Out of the hearing of the jury, the witness was 
confronted with her prior testimony and acknowledged it. When again before the jury, the witness 
testified consistent with her earlier jury testimony. The tribunal told the jury that the witness had 
committed perjury and dismissed the witness. The appellate court said that "[allthough contradic- 
tory testimony such as that confronting the trial court here must surely provoke judicial indigna- 
tion, case law precedent and constitutional precepts forbid judicial interference with the jury's duty 
to resolve credibility issues." Id. at 332. 
The tribunal does not even have the power of penalty. A few litigants have argued that even if 
the tribunal does not have the power to take credibility issues from the trier of fact, it does have the 
power to penalize the perjurious plaintiff by dismissing the cause of action. The few courts that 
have considered the argument have rejected it. See Russell v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1964); 
Parham v. Kohler, 134 So.2d 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). But cf: Mas v. Coca-Cola Co. 163 
F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1947) (court of equity might use the unclean hands doctrine to dismiss an action 
to overturn the Patent Office's finding of interference, because the claimant had used perjured testi- 
mony in the Patent Office hearing). 
In rejecting the proposition that a law court might dismiss a claim in a case in which the plaintiff 
admits to perjury, the Casebolt court emphasized that perjury had other more appropriate 
remedies: 
There are other and independent remedies for relief against pe jury[]  - if and when it 
is found or suspected. The witness may be cited for contempt and a hearing held, with 
appropriate punishment if justified; or, the matter may be referred to the prosecuting at- 
torney of the county for appropriate criminal action, if that is found to be justified. 
384 S.W.2d at 553. Even if such a penalty were appropriate, the issue would not be ripe until 
presentation of all the evidence had been made. 
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tively take the credibility issue from the jury.Io2 Further, the tribunal may 
never base a credibility comment upon information that has not been heard 
by the jury. lo3 
Witness credibility, unlike questions of competence that are exclusively for 
the tribunal, is an issue solely for the trier of fact.104 Were the rule different, 
it would be easy to imagine most trials bogging down in extensive pre-testi- 
mony proffers as lawyers try to demonstrate by various means that the wit- 
ness' credibility is so suspect that the tribunal should not even allow the trier 
of fact to hear the evidence. The trier of fact's sole dominion over credibility 
is not merely a matter of form or convenience. It is one of the definitional 
benchmarks of adversary dispute resolution.105 The tribunal's lack of au- 
thority to pre-screen or dismiss evidence that the tribunal disbelieves is the 
sine qua non of the common law jury system and an important difference 
between the inquisitorial and the adversarial dispute resolution models.lo6 
What then is the tribunal supposed to do with the "facts" that the lawyer 
discloses, if the Formal Opinion is right and subsection 3.3(a)(2) obligates the 
lawyer to disclose the pe jury to the tribunal? The tribunal cannot refuse to 
102. United States v. Bates, 468 F. 2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1972). 
103. Cf: United States v. Breitling, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 252 (1858)(error to charge facts upon a 
jury on which no evidence has been offered). 
104. Kimble v. State, 262 Ind. 522, 319 N.E.2d 140 (1974). Even though the tribunal's common 
law power to exclude an incompetent witness was rooted in the system's search for the truth, it has 
never had the power to declare incompetent a witness with the capacity to lie purposefully. In 
Kimble, the Supreme Court of Indiana addressed the issue of witness credibility. The court held 
that the fact that the complaining witness had used drugs did not automatically make his testimony 
less credible. In analyzing his credibility, the court stated that such challenges contain two distinct 
elements: "[tlhe first challenge is to . . . competency; the second is to . . . credibility. The distinc- 
tion between these objections must be clearly delineated. Competency is a question of law to be 
determined by the court, credibility is a question for the trier of fact." Id. at 525, 319 N.E.2d at 
142-43. 
105. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933)(in reversing decision of federal judge who 
expressed opinion concerning the credibility of witness, holding that "[ilt is for the jury to decide 
the credibility of the . . . witnessW(citing Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203, 207 (1895)). 
106. The proposition is so imbedded in our jurisprudence that it was not budged even by a crimi- 
nal defendant's due process claim. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the defense 
claimed that the circumstances of a prosecution witness made him incredible as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected the claim with attention to the inviolability of the 
trier of fact's credibility jurisdiction, stating that "it does not follow that his testimony was untrue 
. . . . The established safeguards of the Anglo American legal system leave the veracity of a witness 
to be tested by cross examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a prop- 
erly instructed jury." Id. at 31 1. 
The law/fact dichotomy that defines tribunal power versus trier of fact power has continued to 
shift away from the jury. See Kotler, Reappraising The Jury's Role As Finder Of Fact, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 123 (1985)(jury's role should be solely that of true finder of fact to increase predictability, 
efficiency and fairness of trial process). However, credibility is the one area of "fact" in which there 
has been no encroachment. As one commentator has observed, "the institution of the jury was 
developed for the purpose of carrying out this special function of determining whether a witness 
should be believed." Annotation, 62 A.L.R.2d 1191, 1193 (1958). 
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let a party present a witness, cannot tell the jury that the witness lied, cannot 
tell the jury to ignore the witness' testimony, and cannot tell the jury any- 
thing it heard from the lawyer outside the presence of the jury. The lawyer's 
"facts" about the pe jury are not "material" to the tribunal, because the tri- 
bunal has no power to help purge the system of proposed or accomplished 
pe jury. lo7 
If facts are not "material" to the tribunal, they should not be disclosed to 
it. Indeed, subsection 3.3(a)(2) requires disclosure to the tribunal only when 
"necessaly to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client."lo8 
Disclosure to a tribunal without power to act may be more than not "neces- 
sary." It may be, ultimately, harmful. If the lawyer discloses to the tribunal, 
on the theory that disclosure is the only "reasonable remedial measure" for 
pe jury, the lawyer may be prohibited by other Rules and laws from taking 
any further action that might be effective. log 
The Formal Opinion's implicit assumption in applying subsection 3.3(a)(2) 
to client perjury - that potential or completed perjury is a "material fact" to 
be disclosed to a tribunal - warps the meaning of "material," misappre- 
hends the power of the tribunal, and makes things more difficult for the trial 
lawyer without purging the adversary system of results tainted with false 
evidence. While client pe jury is always a "criminal or fraudulent act of the 
client," it is almost never a "material fact" that must be disclosed to a tribu- 
nal. We have and need criminal penalties for perjury precisely because the 
system does not come equipped with a credibility screen for witnesses. 
"Assist" is an important concept in the Model Rules and a precondition to 
applicability of subsection 3.3(a)(2). Throughout the Model Rules, the lawyer 
is admonished not to aid the client in breaking the law or committing a 
fraud.l1° The terminology section of the Model Rules does not define "as- 
107. It is possible that the Committee reads "tribunal" in Model Rule 3.3 broadly to mean either 
the tribunal as forum or the jury as trier of fact. Although that broad definition would cure the 
problem of a tribunal without power to act on the pe jury information, it would create an insoluble 
adversary system problem. If "tribunal" includes trier of fact, the subsection 3.3(a)(2) requirement 
that a lawyer disclose material facts to avoid assisting a client's fraud would require a lawyer to cure 
a client's incomplete answer given with the intent to deceive the trier of fact. While that obligation 
is consistent with the lawyer's duty to the tribunal in procedural matters, it is inconsistent with the 
adversary assumptions of trial on the merits. 
108. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
109. See infra text accompanying notes 96-100 (discussion of the criminal defense lawyer's obli- 
gation to remain silent and take no action if disclosure to the tribunal does not remedy the client's 
pejury). 
110. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d)("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or 
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. . . ."); Rule 3.4 (lawyer 
should not "counsel or assist" any person in obstructing or tampering with evidence, and a lawyer 
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sist," but the usage throughout the Model Rules suggests the normal concept 
of help in preparation of or in completion of the act that is "assisted." 
Formal Opinion 87-353 defines "assist" as a failure to take action to re- 
verse the completed act of another."' Without that definition, subsection 
3.3(a)(2) cannot apply to a lawyer's after-the-fact discovery of client perjury. 
The subsection requires disclosure only if necessary to "avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by the client."l12 But the Committee's analytic 
path to the conclusion that subsection 3.3 (a)(2) applies to client perjury does 
not begin with completed perjury. It begins with an analysis of the situation 
in which the lawyer "knows" of the client's intention to commit perjury. The 
Committee finds disclosure is required under subsection 3.3(a)(2) because 
"offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, [prohibited by subsection 
3.3(a)(4)I9' constitutes "assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the 
client."H3 
Subsection 3.3(a)(4) sets a standard of conduct, prohibiting a lawyer from 
offering false evidence. However, it does not follow that failure to live up to 
the standard assists a "criminal or fraudulent act of the client." It is only on 
the issue of "assisting," rather than the general question of subsection 
3.3(a)(2) applicability, to which the Committee's original question about the 
"criminal or fraudulent act of the client" is relevant. The Committee's con- 
clusion that "offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false" must be an 
"assist," does not take account of the general question of subsection 3.3(a)(2) 
applicability.'14 False evidence is not "criminal" unless it is material and is 
not "fraudulent" unless the witness intends to deceive the tribunal or the 
trier of fact. Subsection 3.3(a)(4), from which the committee takes its "assist- 
ing" act, recognizes the distinction and requires no remedy for evidence that 
is only false. l 5  It is inconsistent to contend that breach of a standard requir- 
ing no remedy in subsection 3.3 (a)(4), compels a disclosure remedy by refer- 
ence under subsection 3.3(a)(2).l l 6  
The Formal Opinion's conclusion that a lawyer "assists" client pe jury by 
shall not "assist a witness to testify falsely"); Rule 8.4(a)("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to violate or attempt to violate the rules, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through acts of another"). 
11 1. See Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. 
1 12. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4)(requiring remedial action by lawyer where "material" 
false evidence is offered). 
116. The subsection's important materiality distinction between the standard of conduct and the 
need for remedial action recognizes that false testimony that is neither material nor relevant is often 
presented in a lawsuit without objection. Consider the corporate officer's untrue testimony that the 
officer is not personally responsible for a decision incorporated in a document which is material to 
liability and which has already been admitted into evidence and conceded to bind the corporation. 
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discovering it after-the-fact and failing to remedy it, is more serious and car- 
ries the risk of great mischief beyond the borders of Model Rule 3.3. Ironi- 
cally, the conclusion is not necessary to achieving a disclosure result in 
appropriatecases. Subsection 3.3(a)(4), by itself, requires a "reasonable re- 
medial measure" for completed client perjury1I7 and disclosure could be that 
remedy. The Standing Committee, apparently unsatisfied with the uncer- 
tainty of disclosure under subsection 3.3(a)(4), attempted to demonstrate 
that the mandatory disclosure of subsection 3.3(a)(2) applied to completed 
client perjury. The "assisting" requirement of subsection 3.3(a)(2) appeared 
to foreclose the possibility, because later discovered client perjury involves no 
action or anticipatory inaction by the lawyer. The Formal Opinion does not 
address the qualities of an "assist" to overcome the analytic problem, but 
rather defines "assist" by reference to the result: 
It is apparent . . . that as used in Rule 3.3(a)(2), the language, "assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by the client". . . is intended to guide the con- 
duct of the lawyer as an officer of the court as a prophylactic measure to 
protect against client perjury contaminating the judicial process. Thus, 
when the lawyer knows the client has committed perjury, disclosure to the 
tribunal is necessary . . . to avoid assisting the criminal act.H8 
Though it offers no rationale for the conclusion that failure to remedy is an 
"assist," the Opinion attempts to counter an anticipated argument over the 
definition: "assisting . . . is not limited to the criminal law concepts of aiding 
and abetting."lI9 Although the importance of "criminal law concepts" is less 
than clear, the assertion may be intended to anticipate an argument about the 
lawyer's lack of assisting intent at the time the lawyer offers the direct testi- 
mony of the lying client. But the problem with the Formal Opinion's defini- 
tion of "assist," as a failure to remedy after-the-fact, is not that the definition 
needs lawyer "intent" to make it work. It lacks temporal relevance. The 
inaction with knowledge, which the Formal Opinion considers an "assist," 
occurs after the testimony. Even the most colloquial definition of "assist" 
requires that it precede or be concurrent with the assisted act. I2O 
The officer's volunteered lie is neither material nor relevant to the lawsuit, but it is important to the 
executive's position and standing within the company. 
What about the testimony of a spouse who, in a no-fault divorce state testifying for the purpose of 
determining property division, offers false testimony about a series of affairs? All issues, save the 
property division, are settled and the affairs are not material to property division. There have been 
hints of infidelity, however, and the spouse/client intends to falsely deny any infidelity for the sake 
of his future relationship with his divorcing spouse and children. 
117. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4). 
118. Formal Op. 353 comment, supra note 5. 
119. Id. 
120. If the Committee has the old common law concept of "accessory after the fact" in mind, it 
does not say so. Although the concept has virtually evaporated from the law, at its height of popu- 
larity it required after-the-fact comfort or assistance to the principal. Silence with knowledge after 
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Until Formal Opinion 87-353, "remedy" and "assist" had nothing to do 
with each other. If "assist" does mean "failure to remedy," many of the 
Model Rules will mean something other than what the drafters intended. 
Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer to "assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent," but goes on to say that the lawyer 
"may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with 
a client."I2l If failure to provide a remedy for a client's criminal or fraudu- 
lent act is an "assist," Model Rule 1.2 requires remedy of any criminal or 
fraudulent act the lawyer hears of in consultation with the client about the 
legality of the proposed act - even though the client acted against the law- 
yer's advice. 
Consider, again, the discriminatory rental policy of the corporate client. 
California passes a law making it a crime not to file a statement of non- 
discrimination with the state's Human Rights Department. The corporation 
asks the lawyer about the consequences of not filing the statement or of filing 
a misleading disclosure. The lawyer tells the corporation that non-filing and 
false filing are crimes. A corporate officer asks the lawyer to file a misleading 
non-discrimination statement. The lawyer advises against that course of ac- 
tion and declines to file the document, in order to avoid assisting a crime in 
violation of Model Rule 1.2. The subject is dropped without resolution. The 
lawyer continues to represent the client on many other related matters.122 
When the client later tells the lawyer that it is neither going to file the 
statement of non-discrimination, nor is it going to file a false document, is the 
lawyer obligated to tell the Human Rights Department? Model Rule 1.6 
clearly prohibits the disclosure123 but the Formal Opinion definition of "as- 
the act would not suffice. See, e.g., Buck v. Commonwealth, 116 Va. 1031, 83 S.E. 390 (1914)(fail- 
ure to report to authorities the escape of a person who has just committed a felony does not make 
one an accessory after the fact). 
12 1. Model Rules 1.2(d) and (e) read as follows: 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or  fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal conse- 
quences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a 
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or applica- 
tion of the law. 
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of 
professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding 
the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct. 
MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(d) & (e). 
122. Model Rule 1.16 contemplates circumstances in which a lawyer who is aware of a client's 
improper action may, nevertheless, continue to represent the client in other matters. Indeed, the 
rules contemplate that it is better for a lawyer to stay with the client and try to reverse the improper 
action than to abandon the client to an environment of no legal advice or to another unsuspecting 
lawyer who can do no more and may, unwittingly, become involved in the illegality. See MODEL 
RULES Rule 1.6 comment. 
123. Model Rule 1.6 reads: 
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sist" would make the lawyer's failure to remedy the client's criminal non- 
filing of the non-discrimination statement an unethical assist under Model 
Rule 1.2. The "failure to remedy" definition of "assist," thus creates incon- 
sistent obligations in Model Rule 1.2 and Model Rule 1.6 and nullifies the 
major rationale for Model Rule 1.2 - the belief that client crime and fraud 
will be reduced if clients feel free to discuss the legality of the proposed ac- 
tion with a lawyer before taking the action. 
The lawyer who learns of a client's fraud after a deposition is faced with an 
insoluble dilemma if "assist" means "failure to remedy." Although Model 
Rule 3.3 does not apply to pre-trial activity conducted away from a tribu- 
nal,124 Model Rule 3.4 does apply.I2' Section 3.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from 
"assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely."126 Assume that the corporate client 
in the rental case answers an interrogatory asking for the names of renters in 
Los Angeles by including the names of blacks who are not renters, but who 
have been paid to appear and to claim to be renters of the corporation's 
apartments, if their depositions are noticed by the plaintiff. None of them is 
willing to testify at trial nor to have their deposition used at trial. After the 
testimony one of the phony renters, at a deposition noticed by the plaintiff 
and at which the lawyer for the corporation asked no questions, the Presi- 
dent tells the lawyer that none of these witnesses can be called at trial, be- 
cause they never rented from the corporation. The President explains the 
agreement about not calling nor using the depositions of the phony renters 
and tells the lawyer that the names were put into the interrogatory answer in 
hopes that the other side would be put off after taking the deposition and 
eliciting the information. 
Model Rule 1.6 prohibits the lawyer from divulging the confidence, even 
after the lawyer withdrawsI2' from the represen ta t i~n .~~~ Using the normal 
definition of "assist," the lawyer's compliance with Model Rule 1.6, by fail- 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client . . . . 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is 
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. 
MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 
124. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 (entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal"). 
125. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.4 (entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel"). 
126. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(b). 
127. Model Rule 1.16(b)(l) permits a lawyer to withdraw from representation "if the client per- 
sists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is 
criminal or fraudulent." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(l). 
128. Model Rule 1.6(d) states that "[ulpon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take 
steps . . . to protect a client's interests." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(d). The comment to Rule 1.6 
suggests that one such interest might include confidentiality: although the court may want an expla- 
nation for the withdrawal, the lawyer "may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would 
constitute such an explanation." Id. at comment. 
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ing to tell the opposing lawyer of the problem, would not create a violation of 
section 3.4(b). The Formal Opinion definition of "assist," however, makes a 
section 3.4(b) violation of the lawyer's failure to tell the opposing lawyer and 
puts the lawyer in the untenable position of violating either Model Rule 3.4 
or Model Rule 1.6.129 
Subsection 3.4(a), concerned with destruction and concealment of evi- 
dence presents a similarly difficult dilemma for the lawyer, if "assist" means 
"failure to remedy." It provides that a lawyer "shall not counsel or assist 
another person" to "unlawfully . . . alter, destroy, or conceal a document or 
other material having potential evidentiary value."130 What if a client, in a 
jurisdiction that makes destruction of potential evidence in anticipation of 
litigation a crime, shows a lawyer three specific documents that might be 
damaging in an anticipated federal antitrust action and asks if the client may 
destroy them? The lawyer tells the client that the reasonable anticipation is 
enough to make destruction a crime and advises that destruction will violate 
the statute even though litigation has not been started. The litigation begins 
a month later, the government requests production of the documents, and 
the client tells the lawyer that no such document exists. When the lawyer 
asks what happened to the documents, the client explains that they were 
destroyed. 
Model Rules 1.6 and 4.1131 absolutely prohibit the lawyer from telling the 
government that the documents have been destroyed. The crime exception 
in Model Rule 1.6 does not permit the lawyer to divulge the confidence, be- 
cause the destruction crime can neither be prevented nor is it one involving 
imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Section 4.l(b) (prohibiting dis- 
closure), rather than subsection 3.3(a)(2) (requiring disclosure), applies to 
the request situation, because the matter is not before a tribunal and the lack 
of candor is not directed at the tribunal. If, however, the lawyer's failure to 
tell the government of the destruction is an "assist," the lawyer must choose 
between violating section 3.4(a) or violating Model Rules 1.6 and 4.1. 
Model Rule 8.4 defines professional misconduct and includes within that 
definition "knowingly assist[ing]" another lawyer in violating the rules of 
professional conduct.132 According to the Formal Opinion definition, silence 
129. Most perjury, indeed most testimony, takes place in pre-trial deposition and never finds its 
way to a fact finder. Model Rule 3.4, regulating pre-trial activity, understandably does not contain 
a provision similar to that contained in Model Rule 3.3, overriding confidentiality. If "assist" 
means "failure to remedy," then the entire pre-trial procedure contemplated in the Model Rules is 
turned upside down. 
130. MODEL RULES Rule 3.4(a). 
131. Model Rule 4.l(b) requires disclosure of a material fact to a third person if necessary to 
avoid assisting a client fraud, but it contains a specific exception if the disclosure requires a breach 
of Model Rule 1.6 confidentiality. MODEL RULES Rule 4.l(b). 
132. MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(a). 
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with after-the-fact knowledge of a rule violation is an "assist." A lawyer, 
therefore, violates Model Rule 8.4 unless the lawyer reports every discovered 
violation. That definition of assist and interpretation of Model Rule 8.4 is 
inconsistent with Model Rule 8.3,133 which deals directly with reporting. 
Under Model Rule 8.3, it is clear that a lawyer does not commit a reporting 
violation, by failing to report all discovered vi01ations.l~~ This represents a 
substantial departure from the universal reporting requirement of the Model 
Code of Professional Re~ponsibili ty.~~~ The Rule gives a lawyer discretion not 
to report a violation unless the violation "raises a substantial question."136 
IV. THE ETHICAL LAWYER IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
Model Rule 3.3 provides a sensible and consistent recitation of candor ob- 
ligations for all trial lawyers, civil and criminal, if attention is paid to the 
Rule's precise language. The letter of the Rule accurately reflects the adver- 
sary system spirit that the Rule is written to preserve. It requires the lawyer, 
as officer of the court, to make representations to a tribunal that are com- 
plete, as well as accurate, when the tribunal will rely upon those representa- 
tions to shape the forum in which the substantive matter will be presented to 
the trier of fact. At the same time, it requires a lawyer presenting evidence to 
the trier of fact to be accurate. It does not require the lawyer to anticipate 
false testimony from witnesses, but does require remedy if the lawyer discov- 
ers that one of those witnesses has offered false evidence that might affect the 
quality of the result on the merits. 
The great danger from Formal Opinion 87-353, and the reason that it 
ought to be withdrawn, is beyond its technical misconstructions of the letter 
of Model Rule 3.3. The danger is to the adversary system spirit of the Model 
Rules, distorted by the failure to recognize the different duties of candor for 
the lawyer before a tribunal and the lawyer before the trier of fact. Further, 
the importance of the independent trier of fact in the common law system of 
adversary justice is threatened by the failure to understand the proper func- 
tion of lawyer and tribunal in assessing the credibility of evidence. 
It is worth pausing to note that disclosure of client perjury to a tribunal 
does not contravene the natural law of decision making. There are many 
systems of dispute resolution that may be as good as or better than the adver- 
133. MODEL RULES Rule 8.3. 
134. Id. 
135. DR 1-103(A) requires that a lawyer report all unprivileged knowledge of violations of the 
Model Code. MODEL CODE D R  1-103(A). 
136. Model Rule 8.3(a) provides that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to 
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the 
appropriate professional authority." MODEL RULES Rule 8.3(a). 
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sary system. It may be that our justice system would be better served if we 
used a more inquisitorial model, giving the lawyer greater responsibility for 
testing the evidence to be presented and giving the tribunal greater control 
over the presentation and weighing of evidence. A pure adversary system 
model might well be improved by repealing client confidentiality and the at- 
torney-client privilege,137 thereby eliminating any contrary value to that of 
candor to the tribunal. The society and the profession have made a contrary 
judgment. 
An assumption that adversary system lawyers and judges can "know" 
things that they either cannot or should not "know" under our system of 
dispute resolution is at the heart of the advice in Formal Opinion 87-353 to 
disclose potential or completed client perjury to the tribunal. Justice Ste- 
vens' concurrence in Nix v. Whiteside properly warns that the client pe jury 
problem is beset by the elusiveness of certainty. He relies on Justice Holmes 
for the reminder that words of dispute resolution certainty, like "fact" and 
"know," have a life of their own.138 What may be "as clear and certain as a 
piece of crystal or a small diamond"139 after the case has been tried and 
examined by multiple layers of jurists, may present a different picture to the 
trial lawyer examining a "handful of gravel."la 
A. THE MEANING OF "KNOW" 
Knowledge - "know" - is a concept that must be defined in context, and 
it is the context that the Standing Committee has missed in its interpretation 
of Model Rule 3.3. "Knows" is used throughout the Model Rules much as it 
is in normal parlance - to identify a level of intellectual certainty sufficient 
to allow or to require the "knowing" person or institution to act or refrain 
from acting. The level of intellectual certainty that constitutes "know" de- 
pends upon the method of gaining the information, the nature of the infor- 
mation to be known, and the enterprise for which the information is relevant. 
How well an individual "knows," for example, about another's intoxication 
level is different, depending upon whether the information is gained from 
another, from observation of the individual drinking, from observation of the 
individual after drinking, or from blood testing. What an individual is will- 
ing to "know" may also depend upon the reason for "knowing" - whether 
137. Commentators have suggested that a functional analysis of confidentiality, focusing on its 
utilitarian rationale, demonstrates that the concept does nothing to improve the quality of surrogate 
performance or of the adversary system results on the merits. See, e.g., Louisell, Confidentiality, 
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112 (1956). 
The position, however theoretically attractive, has never gained much adherence in the profession 
or among the commentators on American justice. 
138. 106 S. Ct. 988 at 1007. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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to sell another drink, whether to allow the person to drive, or whether to find 
that the person is guilty of drunk driving. Similarly, what a lawyer "knows" 
about how the case will be presented or about what a client's testimony will 
be is necessarily different from what a trier of fact "knows" after hearing it. 
What a trial court is entitled to "know" for purposes of a ruling is different 
from what an appellate court must "know" in order to reverse that ruling. 
Without the lawyer's understanding of the adversary system context, the 
terminology section of the Model Rules is of no help in defining "knows." It 
defines "knows" in its own terms, as "actual knowledge of the fact in ques- 
tion" and allows that "knowledge" can be gained by something other than 
direct observation of the fact to be known - "knowledge may be inferred 
from circumstances." 
The Formal Opinion's position that a lawyer should disclose potential cli- 
ent perjury to the tribunal rests on the assumption that a lawyer can "know" 
the future. Whatever might have been the appropriate definition of "know" 
in the context of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, with its prohi- 
bition on divulging a client confidence to remedy completed client pe jury, 
there is no justification for including future client conduct within what a 
lawyer can "know" under Model Rule 3.3. "Knowing" from circumstances 
is one thing; prediction is quite another. Formal Opinion 87-353 interprets 
the comment to Model Rule 3.3 as recognizing that the only justification for 
subordinating client confidences to candor toward the tribunal is to "prevent 
the judgment from being corrupted by the client's unlawful conduct." 14' In 
a world in which the client confidentiality rule prevents a lawyer from reme- 
dying completed client perjury, the goal of "prevent[ing] the judgment from 
being corrupted by the client's unlawful conduct" might justify a definition 
of what a lawyer "knows" that would lead to a rule requiring a lawyer to 
refuse to allow a client to testify, when the lawyer "knows" ahead of time 
that the client will lie.142 But in the world of the Model Rules, where the 
lawyer not only may, but must, remedy discovered client pe jury, there is no 
systematic reason for asking a lawyer to "know" the future at the peril of 
keeping a client from testifying and unilaterally keeping information from 
the trier of fact. 
141. See Formal Op. 353, supra note 5. Formal Opinion 87-353 characterizes the comment as 
follows: 
From the Comment to Rule 3.3, it would appear that the Rule's disclosure requirement 
was meant to apply only in those situations where the lawyer's knowledge of the client's 
fraud or perjury occurs prior to final judgment and disclosure is necessary to prevent the 
judgment from being corrupted by the client's unlawful conduct. 
Id. 
142. In his comprehensive article on client perjury under the Model Code, Professor Wolfram 
asserts and cites authority for the proposition that a lawyer can "know" of potential perjury under 
the Model Code. Wolfram, supra note 4, at 842-848. 
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The subsection 3.3(a)(4) admonition that "a lawyer shall not knowingly 
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false,"143 directs conduct only in 
the very narrow situation in which the lawyer has an active role in creating 
the false evidence. It prohibits a lawyer from helping a client to concoct a 
story, from taking action that helps a client to solicit the false testimony of a 
witness, and from helping a client to create a false exhibit. In each of those 
situations the lawyer "knows" of the nature of the proposed testimony in a 
way that the adversary system wants to control - the lawyer has helped to 
create it. By contrast, a lawyer cannot "know" a future in which the lawyer 
has no creative part. The lawyer cannot "know" whether testimony of a 
witness is false - even after a client's admission of intention - until after 
the lawyer hears the testimony. The cost of a lawyer's pre-testimony specu- 
lation, no matter how good the guess, is too high. It will keep evidence from 
the trier of fact under circumstances in which the lawyer might be wrong 
about the lie and in which the lawyer is obligated to later remedy the false- 
hood, including, if necessary, by giving the trier of fact the information that 
leads the lawyer to know the testimony is false. There is no adversary system 
reason for "know" to mean something that the advocate must determine 
ahead of time. The adversary assumption tells the lawyer to leave the resolu- 
tion of uncertainty - any uncertainty - to the trier of fact. This narrow 
view of what the lawyer can "know" about future testimony is consistent 
with what the adversary system has determined a tribunal can "know" about 
the credibility of any testimony. The adversarial dispute resolution system 
insists that only a trier of fact, after hearing the testimony, can "know" 
whether testimony is credible. It does not allow either court or counsel to 
prejudge the credibility of evidence, if the prejudgment will deprive the trier 
of fact of the evidence.144 
A simple criminal law example demonstrates the general adversary point. 
A criminal defendant admits a robbery to the defense lawyer, but insists on 
putting the government to its proof. The police investigation turns up three 
eyewitnesses. At the lineup, the most credible of the three credible witnesses 
identifies another individual - one with a long record of similar robberies - 
as the one who committed the crime. Is the defense lawyer prohibited by 
subsection 3.3(a)(4) from offering the witness' testimony because the lawyer 
"knows" that the witness is wrong - that the evidence is false? If the lawyer 
can "know" about the veracity of evidence by the client's admission of guilt 
the answer must be yes. The client has told the lawyer that the client com- 
mitted the crime. Our system, however, does not either grant the privilege 
nor impose the burden of knowledge on the defense lawyer. The defense 
lawyer who knows of the evidence and does not offer that witness' testimony 
143. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(4). 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 53-70. 
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to the jury has both done a disservice to the client145 and has usurped the 
jury's right to find the facts and render the verdict. The lawyer has no more 
right to substitute the lawyer's verdict of guilty for the jury's than to substi- 
tute the lawyer's verdict of not guilty for the jury's acquittal. 
Section 3.3(c), a revolutionary change from the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, supports this narrow adversary system view of what a lawyer 
can "know'' and explains the previous eyewitness example in which a lawyer 
presents evidence that, in any other context, the lawyer would "know" to be 
false.146 In reaction to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility's rule 
that a lawyer could exclude only evidence the lawyer "knows" to be false,I4' 
section 3.3(c) of the Model Rules creates a rare exception to the mandate that 
neither court nor counsel can put potential evidence through a credibility 
screen. It allows a civil lawyer to "refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is false."I4* In the civil context, the lawyer need not pres- 
ent the testimony of a witness who is later discovered by the opponent. This 
is not because the lawyer "knows" that the evidence is false, but because the 
lawyer "reasonably believes" it to be false. Section 3.3(c) and Model Rule 
1.2 give the lawyer control over whether a witness will testify and contem- 
plate that the lawyer might refuse to offer the testimony. It is equally clear 
that section 3.3(c) anticipates that a lawyer may ethically present testimony 
that the lawyer "reasonably believes" to be false, and leave it to the trier of 
fact to find the "truth." The civil lawyer is not required to resolve the differ- 
ence between the client's admission and the eyewitness' contrary assertion. 
If "know" in subsection 3.3(a)(4) means more than the certainty that arises 
when the lawyer helps to create the false testimony, the civil lawyer could 
not present the mistaken eyewitness testimony and section 3.3(c) would be 
superfluous. 149 
145. Although the language of Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility - "rep- 
resent[ing] a client zealously" - does not appear in any of the Model Rules, the comment to Model 
Rule 1.3 maintains that the concept remains in the ethics of the profession. See MODEL RULES 1.3 
comment (a lawyer should act "with zeal in advocacy in the client's behalf"). 
146. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(c). 
147. DR 7-102 (A)(4) reads in part: 
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: 
. . . .  
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. 
MODEL CODE DR 7-102(A)(4). 
148. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(c). 
149. Although Model Rule 3.3(c) is not limited to civil lawyers by its language nor buy any 
adversary system value, the Constitution probably prevents a criminal defense lawyer from screen- 
ing evidence for credibility. The comment to section 3.3(c) acknowledges the likely constitutional 
limitation by suggesting that "[iln criminal cases, however, a lawyer may, in some jurisdictions, be 
denied this authority by constitutional requirements governing the right to counsel." MODEL 
RULES Rule 3.3(c). 
The civil lawyer's client has no right to testify; the criminal defense lawyer's client does. Rock v. 
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B. HOW TO HANDLE A LIAR 
The Committee's failure to appreciate the important systematic differences 
between civil and criminal matters led to its embrace of the rigid disclosure 
requirement of subsection 3.3(a)(2) for client perjury, instead of the flexible 
remedial approach in subsection 3.3(a)(4). 
The rigid disclosure requirement that causes unnecessary headaches for 
the civil lawyer, ironically, may remove the defense lawyer's dilemma, at the 
cost of reducing the validity of criminal trial results. If Formal Opinion 87- 
353 endures, the civil lawyer's disclosure to the tribunal, as the reasonable 
remedial measure for pe jury, will not reduce the "truth" before the trier of 
fact. A civil tribunal, though it may have no more power than a criminal 
tribunal to exclude witnesses or to direct a verdict based on credibility, can 
encourage the lawyer to testify before the trier of fact or suggest that the 
opponent call the opposing lawyer. Once a criminal defense lawyer discloses 
potential client pe jury to the tribunal, both the tribunal and the lawyer may 
be prohibited from taking any action to put the information before the trier 
of fact. If the lawyer has complied with subsection 3.3(a)(2) and disclosed 
the potential perjury to the tribunal, Model Rule 1.6 and the defendant's 
bundle of constitutional rights both may prohibit the lawyer from taking fur- 
ther action. 
Model Rule 1.6 confidentiality is not subject to override by section 3.3(b), 
if subsection 3.3(a)(4) does not, by itself, impose a disclosure duty on the 
lawyer. If the analysis in Formal Opinion 87-353 is correct, subsection 
3.3(a)(4) does not by itself impose that duty. Indeed, if it does, there is no 
justification for the Opinion's resort to subsection 3.3(a)(2). The lawyer, 
without a subsection 3.3(a)(4) duty to justify violating the defendant's confi- 
dence pursuant to section 3.3(b), probably cannot notify the prosecutor nor 
testify before the trier of fact. Although the lawyer could attempt to with- 
draw, most commentators agree that courts would often deny it.lS0 
- - -- 
Arkansas, 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987). The civil client has no right to compel the testimony of others; the 
criminal defendant has a personal right to compulsory process. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 
(1967). The civil client has no right to insist upon proceeding pro se; the criminal defendant may 
exercise that right when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806 (1975). 
150. See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 4, at 525-27. Withdrawal is almost impossible in the middle of 
a criminal trial and does not provide a realistic remedy. Dean Lefstein and Professor Freedman, 
who disagree about what a lawyer ought to do when faced with the prospect of putting a lying client 
on the witness stand, agree and present powerful arguments for the proposition that withdrawal 
should never be a solution for the lawyer's client perjury dilemma. I d ;  Freedman, supra note 23, at 
1475-77. Withdrawal pushes the pe jury problem to the next lawyer and may allow the defendant 
to manipulate the system inappropriately. Lefstein, supra note 4, at 525-27. It may also carry some 
double jeopardy risks and may send what may be an unconstitutional message to the jury. 
Ironically, withdrawal in a civil matter may be an effective tool against client perjury. Although 
lawyer withdrawal is not popular with courts in civil matters either, changes in lawyers during the 
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If the lawyer discloses to the tribunal pursuant to subsection 3.3(a)(2), the 
tribunal may be equally stymied without ever reaching the constitutional 
rights that are unique to the criminal defendant. The tribunal cannot act on 
the lawyer's disclosure without hearing the defendant's version. When the 
tribunal questions the defendant outside the presence of the jury, the defend- 
ant is likely to contradict the lawyer, leaving the tribunal with no basis upon 
which to prefer the lawyer's testimony to the defendant's other than the tri- 
bunal's judgment of comparative credibility. Even if the tribunal prefers the 
lawyer to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, it is making a judgment 
beyond its jurisdiction.151 The constitutional limitations on criminal prose- 
cutions prevent the completion of the defendant's perjury from adding any- 
thing to the tribunal's power to deal with the problem. The Constitution 
prohibits a court from requiring a criminal defendant to produce a witness, 
let alone the defendant's lawyer, and prevents the court from telling the pros- 
ecutor to call the defense lawyer. 
All trial lawyers, the courts, and most importantly, the adversary system 
will be better served by ignoring subsection 3.3(a)(2), in matters before a trier 
of fact, and by following the procedure contemplated by subsection 3.3(a)(4), 
at least so long as the adversary system maintains an ethical rule of confiden- 
tiality, the attorney/client privilege, and the criminal defendant's constitu- 
tional rights to testify and to counsel. Subsection 3.3(a)(4) prohibits the 
lawyer from creating false testimony, but does not require the lawyer to haz- 
ard the full presentation of the client's case by predicting the quality of the 
witness' testimony and withholding suspicious t e~ t im0ny . l~~  At the same 
time, it protects the adversary result by requiring remedial action when the 
lawyer's suspicion becomes reality. The lawyer faced with the client's inten- 
tion to lie should warn the client of the consequences, including the lawyer's 
obligation to testify to the fact that lead the lawyer to conclude that the client 
will lie. If the client persists, the lawyer should present the testimony,153 
course of civil litigation is becoming an increasingly common phenomenon. See Goldberg, The * 
Former Client Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. 
REV. 227 (1987)(exploring successive conflict disqualification). Courts that will suffer thin incon- 
venience of lawyer disqualification to protect the marginal risk of confidence disclosure in successive 
conflict cases ought to have no problem with withdrawal to avoid presenting perjury. Withdrawal 
in a civil case presents no problems of double jeopardy, no irresolvable manipulation issues, and no 
risk that withdrawal will merely shift the perjury problem to another lawyer. Further, in a civil 
case, the threat of withdrawal, even if a tribunal might not grant it, is more effective than it is in a 
criminal case. In most criminal cases, the criminal defendant has nothing to lose by the cost and 
the delay that result from withdrawal. Indeed, it may be the best result for which the defendant 
realistically can hope. In all civil cases, one of the parties stands to lose a potential victory by 
withdrawal and all b f  the parties will incur financial cost from the delay. 
15 1. See supra text accompanying note 53-70. 
152. Section 3.3(c), of course, permits the civil trial lawyer to refuse to present a part of the 
client's case that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(c). 
153. The civil lawyer has the alternate possibility of refusing to present the testimony under 
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rather than burden the court with information it cannot use,154 ask for a 
withdrawal that the court will not grant, or allow the witness to testify with- 
out the control of the lawyer's questions. 
The advice to present the testimony applies to all trial lawyers, but the 
criminal defense lawyer may have no c h 0 i ~ e . l ~ ~  Without the benefit of sec- 
tion 3.3(c) and the right to exclude evidence the lawyer reasonably believes to 
be false, the criminal defense lawyer's best opportunity to prevent the perjury 
is to maintain interrogation control over the quality of evidence that goes to 
the trier of fact. By presenting the witness and asking the questions, the 
lawyer maintains a chance to avoid the perjury by the skillful manner of 
interrogation. If the lawyer refuses to conduct the interrogation, the lawyer 
only encourages the defendant to exercise the Faretta right of self-representa- 
tion.15'j In that event, the lawyer loses all opportunity to direct the client's 
testimony, to control the defense, and to call witnesses - which, after the 
client perjury, might include the lawyer. The lawyer who interrogates the 
client who intends to lie, in addition to having a chance to control the testi- 
mony and make the client's perjury more difficult, has the power to impeach 
the defendant. Because the lawyer will not be encumbered by the Model 
Rule 3.7 prohibition against lawyer testimony,157 the lawyer can ask the kind 
of "didn't you tell me" question that would normally be unavailable to a 
cross examining lawyer who is unable to produce the lawyer's own impeach- 
ing testimony that justifies the question. 
In a system of justice that depends upon a trier of fact's judgment about 
truth, all lawyers should act in a way that is consistent with that goal. That 
does not allow a lawyer to unilaterally deny to a trier of fact what the lawyer 
believes will be perjurious, no matter the certainty nor the rectitude of the 
section 3.3(c). See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(c). The problem with that as a practical solution is that 
lawyers have very little experience with the exercise of eliminating or censuring a client's testimony. 
If civil lawyers ought to begin refusing to present testimony they believe to be false, rather than use 
the "wait and see" approach, there is much to be discussed about the nature of the standard, the 
method for determining a lawyer's reasonable belief, and the method for handling the consequences 
to the lawyer, the client and the system if the lawyer is wrong. 
154. The tribunal's inability to use the information to stop the perjury may increase the risk that 
the tribunal will use the information inappropriately. Disclosure of completed perjury creates the 
risk that the court will use the knowledge in sentencing if the defendant is convicted. Perjury is 
punishable by a term set by the legislature and only after a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The lawyer has no right nor reason for risking increased penalty for the client. Disclosure 
does not nullify the perjury in reaching an adversary result. Indeed, because the jury convicted, it is 
clear that no "remedial measure" is needed. The lawyer has no permit to breach confidence and 
there is great risk the tribunal will use it to inappropriately penalize the client. 
155. See supra note 95. 
156. See id. 
157. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.7 and supra note 62. 
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belief. Similarly, it does not require a lawyer to take action that may assist a 
tribunal and a prosecutor in a pe jury prosecution, but will be futile in cor- 
recting the current record before the trier of fact on the merits. It is the 
lawyer's task to try to keep perjury out of the system, to get the client to 
correct pe jury if it becomes part of the proceedings, and if nothing else will 
work, to make the record before the trier of fact sufficiently complete so that 
the trier of fact can exercise its obligation to make a judgment. 
Model Rule 3.3 can be a valuable aid for civil lawyers faced with the too 
common problem of client perjury. Its flexible approach to a real problem 
ought not be ignored in pursuit of a rigid answer to a rare hypothetical - 
particularly when the rigid answer does not solve the real problem. Formal 
Opinion 87-353 ought to be withdrawn. It creates interpretive chaos in the 
place of straightforward text. Model Rule 3.3 does not have to be bent out of 
shape to protect the system from the evil of perjury. It ought not be bent out 
of shape to increase the system's ability to prosecute perjury. So long as we 
operate an adversary system of justice in which truth is what a jury finds, 
courts cannot prejudge credibility and lawyers ought not be put in a position 
to attempt what the courts are powerless to accomplish. 
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